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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to re-examine the relationship between fiscal federalism and the size 
of  local  governments.  Traditionally,  the  empirical  studies  have  focused  on  the  different 
accountability power of grants and local taxes, concluding that the former encourages the 
growth and the latter contributes to contain local public spending. Yet, the existing literature 
is  more  silent  about  the  possibility  that  different  types  of  tax  autonomy  may  still  have 
differential impacts on the expansion of the local public sector. The paper addresses this issue 
by introducing a new testable hypothesis - the “Tax Separation Hypothesis” (TSH) - according 
to which tax decentralisation organised on tax bases used only by local governments would 
favour most the containment of local public expenditures, while that organised on tax base 
sharing (i.e. piggybacking mechanisms) is not expected to have a significant impact on the local 
government size. Using an unbalanced panel data set of OECD countries, we adopt the novel 
approach of disentangling the impact of local taxes - on income, property, and goods and 
services - on the size of the local public sector. In particular, property taxes only - mostly 
based on a “tax separation” scheme - seem to have a negative impact on the size of local 
government. Instead, both income taxes and general taxes on goods and services – often 
shared with central governments – have uncertain impacts on the size of local governments 
(and more frequently positive). We conclude that tax decentralisation is a necessary condition 
to contain local public expenditures, yet it is not sufficient, as a tax separation scheme would 
in fact be required. 
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The relationship between fiscal federalism and the size of the public sector remains an area of 
theoretical debate open to empirical investigations. On the one hand, the traditional theory of 
fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 1956; Buchanan, 1965; Oates, 1972) does not fully handle how 
decentralisation  may  affect  government  size.  The  key  point  of  this  approach  is  that  a 
“benevolent” central policy maker can better take into account heterogeneous preferences in 
different  local  governments  by  decentralising  the  supply  of  local  public  goods.  To  some 
extent, the benevolent nature of both central and local decision-makers rules out politicians’ 
misbehaviour, regardless of whether local governments are financed either by own taxes or 
by central grants. The main implication is that the expansion of the public sector will occur 
up to a point that is agreed on by individual preferences only. 
On the other hand, more recent analyses of fiscal federalism - mainly attributable to Public 
Choice scholars - have highlighted that benevolent politicians are the exception rather than 
the  rule.  According  to  this  theory,  politicians  misbehave  and  compete  in  various  ways 
according  to  their  own  objective  functions  (see  the  standard  models  by  Brennan  and 
Buchanan,  1980;  Salmon,  1987;  Breton,  1987).  These  theories  develop  interesting 
implications  concerning  the  relation  between  decentralisation  and  government  size.  For 
example, they usually favour fiscal competition among local governments (on both the tax 
and the expenditure side), in order to attract tax bases (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). 
Furthermore,  they  suggest  that  the  electoral  competition  would  provide  an  incentive 
mechanism  that  would  make  policy-makers  more  accountable  (e.g.,  Salmon,  1987).  In  all 
cases, a competitive mechanism would serve to discipline potentially “bad” politicians (e.g. 
Besley and Case, 1995), in this way reducing both rent-seeking behaviour and the monopoly 
power of both central and local political agents.  
As a consequence, these theories (often grouped under the heading of “theories of competitive 
federalism”) would support smaller public sectors in decentralised countries, on the basis of 
the argument that local decision-makers are more accountable to local voters and therefore 
have few opportunities to misbehave. Yet, even though decentralisation may be necessary for 
responsible behaviour, it may not be sufficient. The existing literature suggests that the best 
way to enforce local responsibility is to assign significant tax autonomy to local governments; 
on the contrary, central government grants would facilitate local governments’ misconduct 
and  therefore  an  inefficient  growth  of  local  expenditures.  The  reason  is  intuitive.  Local 
decision-makers are forced to use own resources better than they would use the common pool 
of national resources. One should therefore expect that different systems of local taxes and 
intergovernmental grants may affect local governments’ attitudes and policy choices because 
of different fiscal incentives associated with financing sources (Weingast, 2009).  
As argued by Shah (1999), “to ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be 
made to face financial consequences of their decisions.” Other authors have suggested that 
sub-national governments that lack independent sources of revenue can never truly enjoy 
fiscal autonomy; and, similarly, that grants can make local governments less accountable for 
their fiscal decisions (Bahl and Linn, 1992; McLure, 1998). More recently, and for the Italian 
case, Boetti et al. (2010) show that more autonomous municipalities – i.e. local governments 
with  a  higher  share  of  current  spending  covered  by  own  taxes  –  exhibit  less  inefficient 
behaviours; furthermore, public services provided to citizens are more efficient and effective. 
As a result, there is widespread agreement in the literature on the fact that the size of the 
public sector can be smaller when decentralisation is funded by own taxes; and comparatively 
larger,  when  funding  comes  from  central  government  grants.1  This  qualifies  the  general 
result that decentralisation entails lower local expenditures (and lower total spending) only 
when  it  is  based  on  tax  autonomy;  while  a  decentralisation  funded  by  grants  would  be 
ineffective in reducing the size of the public sector. 
                                                 
1  These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  broad  argument  developed  by  Brennan  and  Buchanan  (1978,  1980) 
according to which responsive tax bases may help limit the growth of the public sector in the case of Leviathan 
governments, enhancing political accountability.   7 
Quite surprisingly, however, while the different accountability content of grants and own 
taxes has been over time sufficiently explored, the existing literature is more silent about the 
possibility that different types of tax autonomy may still have differential impacts on the 
expansion of the public sector. Recent results obtained in Cassette and Paty (2010) show that 
decentralisation may unexpectedly increase sub-central government size even when financed 
by own tax revenues.2 On the one hand, this result empirically supports previous theoretical 
evidence showing that when several government levels share the same tax base (even with 
some degree of autonomy), the aggregate equilibrium tax rate can be higher contrasted with 
the  case  where  tax  bases  would  be  used  by  local  governments  only  (e.g.  Keen  and 
Kotsogiannis, 2004). This may suggest that the equilibrium level of spending can also be 
higher. However, an analysis of what kind of local taxes are responsible for this result is still 
empirically lacking. 
The  observation  of  decentralised  tax  systems  in  OECD  countries  reveals  that  tax 
decentralisation  may  have  different  characteristics.  Some  taxes  are  decentralised  through 
tax/revenue  sharing  or  tax  base  sharing  methods  (usually  income  and  consumption-type 
taxes), while other taxes are applied on a “tax separation” basis.3 This latter scheme implies 
that a given tax base is exclusively used by one level of government only.4 Now, while a 
certain agreement is achieved about the fact that tax/revenue sharing have effects that are 
strictly comparable to those produced by central grants, the possibility that sharing tax bases 
between  local  and  central  governments  (also  referred  to  as  piggybacking)  may  entail  a 
comparable effect is overlooked. 
In fact, allowing local governments to piggyback on central tax bases may reduce the 
perceived competition among government levels, may insulate local jurisdictions from the 
responsibility  of  changing  their  tax  bases  (Zax,  1988)  and  may  generate  more  local  tax 
illusion to the extent that the consequences of central government tax policies on local tax 
revenues are not clearly disentangled and observed by citizens. In this case, as already argued 
by McKenzie and Staff (1978), local spending might increase. Thus, the fact that piggybacked 
taxes tend to grow with less political fuss than taxes based on a “tax separation” scheme 
suggests that increased reliance on these taxes for decentralisation purposes must be viewed 
with mixed feelings (Bahl and Bird, 2008) if the aim is to contain public spending. In other 
words, tax decentralisation may not necessarily shrink the size of local public sectors. In fact, 
there are reasons to believe that this latter outcome is more likely to occur when local taxes 
are applied on a “tax separation” scheme rather than on a tax base sharing method. Tax 
separation – in the sense of the local government exclusive use of a given tax base – would 
improve accountability, would better help disentangle local and central responsibilities and 
would make easier for voters to link what is spent for what (broadly, the application of the 
benefit principle of taxation). 
In  order  to  shed  some  light  on  this  issue,  this  paper  investigates  the  impact  of  tax 
decentralisation  on  the  size  of  local  public  sectors  by  using  the  novel  approach  of 
disaggregating own local tax revenues into income taxes, property taxes and taxes on goods 
and services. This disaggregation is proposed for two reasons. The first is strictly empirical, 
as available data do not allow making recourse to a finer partition of local tax revenues. Yet – 
and this is the second reason – while income and consumption taxes are usually decentralised 
on a tax base sharing method, property taxes are  mostly based on a tax separation scheme. 
Thus, by capturing the possible different impacts of these tax categories would allow us to 
capture the differential impact of different tax decentralisation schemes and to qualify the 
result obtained by Cassette and Paty (2010), that revenue decentralisation increases local 
government size. To make our study robust to conventional results (e.g. Rodden, 2003) – 
                                                 
2 They also show that the increase of local government size is larger than the reduction of the central government 
size, thus leading to a larger aggregate government size. 
3 Tax sharing identifies a system where the central government pays local governments a fraction of the taxes that 
originate from the local territories. Revenue sharing, instead, identifies an alternative mechanism where the central 
government pays local governments a certain amount of a given central tax on the basis of indicator of needs.  
4 Even though “tax separation” between different tiers of government appears a more orderly approach (Musgrave, 
1983), in practice models of “tax base sharing” – where the same uniform tax base is taxed by both the central and 
the regional or local governments – seem to prevail. 
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consistent  with  the  “common  pool”  hypothesis  and  the  “flypaper  effect”  –  grants  from  higher 
levels of government are included into the analysis and expected to positively affect the size 
of local public sectors. 
Results  are  very  encouraging.  While  grants  have  the  standard  (positive)  impact,  new 
insights  emerge  from  considering  disaggregated  taxes.  In  particular,  property  taxes  only 
seem to play a negative impact on the size of the local public sector. Instead, both income 
taxes and general taxes on goods and services – that are often applied with either a tax 
sharing  or  a  tax  base  sharing  method  –  have  uncertain  impacts  on  the  size  of  local 
governments (and more frequently positive). This outcome, combined with other available 
results  on  this  topic,  would  lead  towards  the  conclusion  that  tax  decentralisation  is  a 
necessary condition to reduce the size of the public sector, yet it is not sufficient. According 




2. Fiscal federalism and government size: the testable hypotheses 
 
There are several empirical contributions on the relationship between decentralisation and 
government size. Unfortunately, strict comparability among those studies is prevented by the 
different content of the hypotheses tested, by the different variables used and by the different 
period and country coverage. Nevertheless, an attempt can be made of distinguishing the 
empirical achievements according to the following testable hypotheses: a) Decentralisation 
Hypothesis  (DH);  b)  Wallis  Hypothesis  (WH);  c)  Leviathan  Hypothesis  (LH);  d) 
Fragmentation Hypothesis (FH); e) Collusion Hypothesis (CH); f) Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis 
(FIH). 
In order to shed some light on the main findings of the various contributions analysed, 
table 1 reports a simplified summary of the corresponding outcomes, where it is noted that 
some studies actually test more than one hypothesis and that one important discriminatory 
factor is the measurement of government size (total, central or local government). 
In  more  detail,  the  “Decentralisation  Hypothesis”  (DH)  is  perhaps  the  most  popular 
hypothesis in the theory of fiscal federalism. According to it, fiscal decentralisation would 
lead to greater efficiency and a leaner public sector. In this case, by having local governments 
tailoring  the  optimal  level  of  local  public  goods  on  local  preferences,  the  risk  of 
overexpansion of central government spending would be minimized, leading to a smaller size 
of the general government. Oates (1972) – who originally proposed this hypothesis – actually 
found  a  negative  relation  between  decentralisation  and  total  government  (TG)  size.  A 
number of successive studies (still using TG) have confirmed this hypothesis (Marlow, 1988; 
Grossman, 1989; Ehdaie, 1994) who simultaneously includes tax and spending choices in the 
same decentralisation process). More recently, Prohl and Schneider (2009) have also tested 
the  Oates’s  theorem  and  have  shown  that  in  countries  where  revenues  and  expenditure 
responsibilities  are  largely  decentralised,  a  lower  growth  in  total  government  size  would 
emerge. Finally, while Zax (1989) has confirmed the same outcome for local government 
(LG)  size,  a  couple  of  studies  have  tried  to  verify  DH  using  different  definitions  of 
government  size  (TG,  CG  and  LG).  In  one  case  (Jin  and  Zou,  2002),  the  impact  of 
decentralisation would be to increase the size of LG and to reduce the size of CG, with a 
negative total effect on TG size. This would imply that the reduction at the central level 
outperforms the increase at the local level. However, in another case (Cassette and Paty, 
2010), the increase at the local level seems to outperform the reduction at the central level, 
leading to a net increase of TG size. The only inconclusive study, among the set of those 
testing DH, is by Pereira (2000), who does not find any support for DH for a set of European 
countries. Rather, he suggests that the size of the public sector is affected only by the per 
capita income, and not by the degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
Within the context of the more traditional theory of fiscal federalism, the possibility of a 
positive relationship between government size and decentralisation is explicitly addressed by 
the “Wallis Hypothesis” (WH). The argument runs as follows. Fiscal decentralisation would 
increase the size of sub-national governments because local provision of public goods may   9 
increase  local  spending  and  encourage  local  governments  to  take  on  a  wider  range  of 
expenditure functions and fiscal responsibility. As decentralised supply of public goods can 
better suit local preferences, it may also produce an increased demand for local public goods 
and, consequently, a higher level of local public spending. A number of studies has actually 
tested  WH,  confirming  its  validity  when  using  local  government  size  (Wallis  and  Oates, 
1988; Forbes and Zampelli, 1989; De Mello, 2001; Jin and Zou, 2002) or, in one case, total 
government size (Shadbegian, 1999). 
The “Leviathan Hypothesis” (LH) – mostly developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) – 
shares with DH the idea that decentralisation would lead to a smaller public sector. More 
precisely, LH predicts that the size of the public sector varies inversely with the extent of 
fiscal decentralisation. However, the mechanics of this outcome is different, compared with 
DH.  On  the  basis  of  the  assumption  that  central  governments  are  revenue-maximizing 
Leviathans with monopoly power, LH concludes that fiscal competition among jurisdictions 
would limit the central government’s excessive taxing power and reduce the tax burden of 
individuals. Following this logic, decentralisation would be efficient,5 with a lower tax burden 
leading to a smaller public budget.6 One often overlooked consequence of this hypothesis is 
that efficiency will be encouraged most if mobile tax bases are taxed most, a principle that is 
at odds with the traditional tax assignment principles developed by Musgrave (1983) and 
King  (1984).  The  exit  option  that  these  tax  bases  may  exploit  in  the  case  of  “excessive” 
taxation (compared with the corresponding benefits) would indeed prevent local decision-
makers from behaving as local Leviathans (Liberati, 2010). LH was the subject of several 
empirical analyses and different results have emerged. Among the studies using TG as the 
dependent  variable,  the  outcomes  mostly  confirm  the  hypothesis  (Marlow,  1988;  Edhaie, 
1994; Shadbegian, 1999; Rodden, 2003; Fiva, 2006; Ashworth et al., 2009), with the exception 
of  Stein  (1999)  –  a  positive  sign  –  and  Oates  (1985),  with  no  significant  relation  found 
(declaring Leviathan a “mythical beast”). Other studies test LH using local government size, 
with  mixed  outcomes.  On  the  one  hand,  Nelson  (1987)  and  Feld  et  al.  (2003)  find  that 
decentralisation  reduces  LG  size;  while  an  opposite  result  is  supported  by  Forbes  and 
Zampelli  (1989)  and  Rodden  (2003).  This  latter  study  complements  the  analysis  also 
investigating what happens at the central level, supporting a reduction of CG size. Oates 
(1985) again does not find any support for LH even considering LG in the United States. 
A natural corollary of LH is the “Fragmentation Hypothesis” (FH) that suggests that “the 
potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in 
the inclusive territory” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). In other words, the higher the number of 
local governments, the lower the government size, with more binding competitive pressures 
among jurisdictions emerging more likely when they are similar in size and in economic 
power (Fausto, 1996). A test of this hypothesis cannot be traced in a large number of studies 
(only four in table 1). Nelson (1987) and Zax (1989) have actually found support to FH using 
the LG size, with some caveats. In particular, Nelson (1987) argues that the dampening effect 
of  fiscal  decentralisation  on  the  size  of  the  public  sector  may  not  solely  depend  on  the 
(increasing) number of local units, but on their size and on the functions they perform. After 
distinguishing between general-purpose and specific-purpose local governments, he therefore 
finds a fairly robust support for FH only for general-purpose governments. Feld et al. (2003), 
instead, demonstrate that fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government 
revenue for Swiss cantons.7 In this particular case, the reduction of government size would be 
imputable  to  the  fiscal  autonomy  of  sub-federal  governments,  and  not  to  the  competitive 
pressure that emerges from having many governmental units. Finally, Oates (1985) – using 
                                                 
5  “Overall  intrusion  of  government  into  economy  may  be  smaller,  the  grater  the  extent  to  which  taxes  and 
expenditures are decentralized” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). 
6 In general, in the public choice perspective of “excessive government”, tax competition reduces rents and, hence, a 
smaller public sector enhances overall welfare (Rodden, 2003). In other public economics models (Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986), with benevolent despots in an optimal taxation framework, a similar connection 
between tax competition and smaller government has also established. 
7  Only  with  respect  to  the  tax  structure  two  notable  effects  can  be  found:  tax  revenue  from  income  taxes  is 
negatively  affected  by  fragmentation,  even  though  only  marginally  significant,  while  capital  tax  revenue  is 
significantly positively influenced.   10 
the number of local governments as a proxy for fiscal federalism – also shows inconclusive 
results. 
There might be cases where competitive pressures are inhibited by the behaviour of local 
governments. To this regard, the “Collusion Hypothesis” (CH) suggests that when sub-central 
governments collude, they may be able to increase their own total revenues and spending 
beyond the level that would otherwise be attained in a competitive environment. The direct 
consequence  is  that  when  fiscal  decentralisation  does  not  foster  competition  among  local 
governments,  local  expenditures  may  increase  rather  than  fall.8  Many  studies  actually 
support  this  hypothesis,  as  reported  in  table  1,  regardless  of  the  specific  definition  of 
government  size,  with  the  exception  of  De  Mello  (2001)  for  LG.  But  how  is  it  that 
decentralisation does not foster competition? Some studies explicitly testing this hypothesis 
(Grossman, 1989; Grossman and West, 1994; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Cassette and 
Paty, 2010) show that when decentralisation is funded by grants or shared revenues and 
controlled for by the central government, it may have opposite effects than it could otherwise 
have if own local taxes were used. In short, central government grants would have a positive 
effect  on  the  growth  of  public  expenditures,  while  fiscal  autonomy  of  sub-national 
governments would have a negative impact. 
That fiscal decentralisation may increase the size of government is then explicitly stated 
by  the  “Fiscal  Illusion  Hypothesis”  (FIH)  developed  by  Winer  (1983)  and  Dollery  and 
Worthington  (1996).  When  decentralisation  is  based  on  grants  from  higher  levels  of 
government, rather than on own local revenues, taxpayers in the recipient jurisdiction may 
perceive public provision as being financed by non-residents. A similar effect can be obtained 
in  the  case  of  “tax  exporting”  (Feld  et  al.,  2003).9  The  potential  problem  arising  from 
exporting the tax burden to other jurisdictions is the same as it occurs with revenue sharing 
methods,  i.e.  both  reduce  the  perceived  tax-price  of  local  services,  allowing  sub-national 
governments to increase spending above levels otherwise tolerated by voters/taxpayers. In 
particular,  De  Mello  (2001)  has  tested  FIH  in  Moldova  in  1998  and  has  found  that  the 
vertical  imbalance  variable  –  as  a  proxy  of  fiscal  illusion  –  is  negative  and  statistically 
significant for sub-national government size. 
It is worth noting that other studies have highlighted the role of vertical imbalance in 
shaping the size of the local, national and aggregate size of the public sector upward (Edhaie, 
1994; Stein, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Fiva, 2006; Prohl 
and Schneider, 2009; Cassette and Paty, 2010). However, while it is standard to focus on the 
potential  different  impact  of  grants  (positive)  and  all  own  local  taxes  (negative)  on 
government size, it is virtually absent any consideration about the fact that not all taxes may 
have  the  same  impact.  In  other  words,  the  “quality”  of  tax  decentralisation  is  mostly 
disregarded in the treatment of all previous hypotheses. Yet, the way in which taxes can be 
used by local governments is of crucial importance for the control of local public spending. 
To  this  purpose,  we  propose  a  new  testable  hypothesis,  that  we  call  the  “Tax  Separation 
Hypothesis”  (TSH),  by  which  tax  decentralisation  organised  on  tax  bases  used  by  local 
governments only would favour most the containment of local public expenditures. At the 
same  time,  we  maintain  that  tax  decentralisation  organised  on  a  tax  base  sharing  is  not 
expected to have a significant impact on the local government size. 
 
 
3. Local taxation trend 
 
Recent statistics (OECD, 2009a) show that the average shares of sub-central governments 
(SCG) tax revenue in the OECD countries, in 2005, is 11.6 percent of GDP, covering just 
above 33 percent of the general government tax revenue. Compared with the figures of a 
decade earlier (1995), there has been an increase of 2.1 percent of GDP and 1.8 percent of 
                                                 
8 Moreover, Keen and Marchand (1997) show that fiscal competition may lead not only to inefficient levels of 
aggregate public expenditures, but also to systematic inefficiencies in the composition of public expenditures. 
9 In their contribution, tax exporting is measured by the number of tourist nights per capita. The idea is that tax 
exporting possibilities relax the pressure that exit and voice exert on fiscal authorities. Hence, tax exporting leads 
to higher tax revenue.   11 
total  tax  revenue.  For  many  countries,  the  changes  have  been  negligible,  with  the  most 
notable exceptions being Japan (+6.9 percent of GDP), Spain (+6.8 percent of GDP), Korea 
(+4.6 percent of GDP), and Poland (+3.8 percent of GDP). This slight increase of SCG tax 
revenue  has  been  only  a  partial  answer  to  the  increase  of  the  degree  of  expenditure 
decentralisation. As reported by OECD (2009c), the vertical fiscal gap has indeed increased, 
which means that the use of grants has also increased across countries. Decentralisation has 
therefore become more asymmetric, with countries approaching the vertical fiscal gap with 
different strategies; for example, between 1995 and 2005, Spain, Australia, Italy, the Czech 
Republic, and Ireland have mainly strengthened local tax powers, while Mexico, Turkey, 
Poland, and the Slovak Republic have intensified the recourse to grants. At the same time, 
changes  for  many  OECD  countries  have  been  negligible.  As  reported  by  OECD  (2009c), 
“[a]pparently, the revenue composition of sub-central government seems to be very country 
specific, quite stable and determined by history and institutions rather than policy choice”.  
Looking at the first two columns of table 2, reporting data for the countries that will be 
included in our analysis (on which see below), one can share the same impression with regard 
to  the  share  of  sub-central  tax  revenue  over  GDP.  Indeed,  with  Spain  the  only  notable 
exception, the evolution of tax autonomy between 1995 and 2005 is significantly slow when 
measured over GDP. The same outcome is obtained when looking at the fraction of local 
taxation over general government tax revenue (again Spain the only exception, not reported 
in table) and at the fraction of grants over GDP, whose change between 2000 and 2006 has 
been negligible for most countries. Observing the composition of SCG revenues in 2005, it is 
possible to note that, on average, around half of their revenue is covered by own taxes and 
half  by  intergovernmental  grants,  without  deep  changes  over  time  but  with  some  wide 
differences  among  countries,  with  the  extremes  of  Iceland,  covering  90  percent  of  SCG 
revenues through taxes, and Netherlands, covering just about 13 percent (OECD, 2009c).10 
However, only a fraction of tax revenue allocated to SCG is generally under their control. 
Indeed, their power to set and change tax rates and the tax base is often restricted. In many 
federal countries and some unitary ones, SCG take part in tax sharing arrangements where 
the tax revenue allocated to a single local government is either determined by all sub-central 
governments together or by central government. 
In this sense, particularly important also for the following analysis – perhaps more than 
the indicators on the size and composition of local revenues – is how taxes are assigned to 
local governments. More specifically, it is here suggested that a degree of tax autonomy 
based on a separation scheme may be more effective than tax sharing methods, including tax 
base sharing (i.e. piggybacking). To this purpose, it is worth concentrating on the three main 
taxes available to local governments: income, consumption, and property taxes. 
Overall, these taxes account for about 95 percent of SCG tax revenues. In particular, from 
1995 to 2005, taxes on income, profits and capital gains (IT) have increased over time from 
about 38 to 42 percent of total sub-central revenues; while taxes on property (PT) seem to 
have experienced a gradual decline in many countries, from 34 to 31 percent; finally, the 
share of consumption-type taxes has also increased (GST), although a large part of this effect 
is due to new tax sharing arrangements where SCG have little taxing power (OECD, 2009c). 
To  summarise,  local  property  taxes  have  slowly  given  way  to  sharing  arrangements  of 
consumption taxes, while the income tax has retained its predominant role. 
The distribution of IT appears to be quite uniform between unitary and federal countries, 
with the exceptions of Germany and Switzerland where sub-national governments collect 
over 50 percent of current revenues through IT. These taxes are also the predominant sub-
central tax source in Scandinavian unitary countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden),  a  feature  that  marks  a  difference  with  most  English-speaking  countries,  where 
property taxes account for the overwhelming part of local tax revenues.11  
The predominant role of income taxes among SCG sources in many countries is likely due 
to the fact that central governments usually cede a part of income taxation to SCG either 
                                                 
10 Moreover, federal countries allocate a slightly higher tax share to SCG than unitary countries. 
11 The preference for income taxes probably arises for their greater adherence to the ability-to-pay principle of 
taxation, and for their more effective role in reducing income inequalities, a role particularly important in the 
tax/benefit structure of Scandinavian countries.   12 
through a pure tax-sharing formula or through the introduction of a proportional surcharge 
on  national  figures  (tax  base  or  tax  liability)  with  discretion  on  rates  and  reliefs.  Such 
piggybacking mechanisms (letter b) are adopted in several countries among those reported in 
table 2 (in 2005, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United States), while the other countries usually make recourse (with 
small variations over time) to pure tax sharing formulas (letter d in table 2). In any case – 
crucial  for  our  analysis  –  the  IT  are  almost  never  assigned  exclusively  to  sub-central 
governments, i.e., they do not follow a tax separation scheme. At the best, local governments 
apply a local tax in coexistence with a national tax on the same tax base; thus, to enhance 
revenue autonomy, local governments may be only allowed discretion in setting tax rates - 
between minimum and maximum levels - which are nationally legislated. 
Quite the same reasoning can be done with regard to taxes on goods and services (GST). 
On average, they account for a smaller share of total tax revenues in the sample of table 2 – 
19 percent – with a large variability in their use, with the peak achieved in large countries, 
like the United States and Canada, where they provide about 1/3 of total local revenues. 
These two countries, in 2005, are also the only ones assigning wide responsibility of taxation 
of goods and services at the local level. Indeed, unlike the IT, there is a large number of cases 
where pure tax sharing formula prevail (letter d) in all years and for government levels of 
various size.12 In short, this form of revenue-sharing does little to enhance revenue autonomy 
or accountability among SCG.  
Finally,  local  property  taxes  (PT)  are  the  second  main  local  own  source  and  this  is 
particularly true for relatively smaller government levels within countries. The reason can be 
traced back to the principles of tax assignment formulated by Musgrave (1983) and King 
(1984) by which property taxes are a good source of local taxation for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that they secure enough tax revenue to local governments without fears of 
tax competition. Indeed, the tax base cannot migrate in response to tax rate changes (at least 
in the short run), there is usually no ambiguity about which authority is entitled to tax, and 
the tax base is relatively stable and predictable over economic cycles. Moreover, the property 
tax  typically  poses  no  significant  problem  of  tax  base  competition  with  the  central 
government,  basically  because  this  is  not  a  tax  that  central  governments  tend  to  cover 
(Martinez-Vazquez,  2008),  and,  because  it  approximates  the  benefit  principle  of  taxation, 
which is a desirable principle of local taxation.  
Unlike IT and GST, the weight of PT has gradually decreased over time. At the same 
time, they represent the main source of the overall sub-central government financing in some 
countries (e.g. Australia and United Kingdom) and the main source of financing for most of 
smaller government levels that apply PT. A key point is that the property tax is hardly 
involved  in  pure  tax  sharing  formulas  (letter  d).  To  our  knowledge,  in  2005,  this  only 
happens  in  Austria.  In  all  other  cases  (letters  a  and  b),  the  use  of  local  property  tax  is 
associated to a tax separation scheme. This marks an important difference within the context 
of  tax  autonomy;  in  general,  what  is  strongly  required  from  the  revenue  assignment  is 
accountability and political and fiscal responsibility for SCG officials. As a matter of fact, 
achieving a good level of tax autonomy has many benefits, including the imposition of hard 
budget constraints on SCG. Our maintained hypothesis, in what follows, is that a letter b 
associated with a tax separation scheme can produce a larger impact on local government 
spending. With a reasonable degree of approximation, this would imply that among the three 
big groups of taxes here considered, property taxes should be the most effective to control 
local  spending,  as  they  are  contemporaneously  characterised  by  both  a  large  degree  of 
autonomy and a predominance of tax separation schemes. This implies that even though the 
property tax is applied on the basis of a national scheme, the action of local governments can 
be more visible and more accountable. This feature appears to be consistent over time and 
across  countries,  at  least  for  the  countries  and  the  period  that  will  be  considered  in  our 
analysis. To summarise, the degree of discretion given to local governments to manipulate 
                                                 
12 In general, the main difficulty for assigning GST to the sub-national level lies in the fact that the debiting and 
crediting of the VAT, for example, is likely to take place in different sub-central jurisdictions, which usually will 
imply an arbitrary apportionment of VAT revenues across jurisdictions.  
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the property tax may vary but the thinking that this tax belongs to local governments seems 




4. The empirical strategy 
 
4.1. Empirical specification, coverage and econometric issues 
 
To verify whether tax decentralisation affects the size of the local public sector, we regress a 
set of explanatory variables on local government size. The basic specification for a cross-
section (i) time-series (t) analysis is: 
 
(1)     
 
where all variables are expressed in logarithmic form. In detail: Size is local government size; 
IT denotes local income taxes; PT denotes property taxes; GST denotes taxes on goods and 
services; GR indicates current grants from other government levels. All these variables are 
normalised on what we call aggregate local revenues, given by the sum of local tax revenues and 
grants from other government levels.13  
A  set  of  control  variables  (Cont)  is  also  included:  population;  population  below  age  14; 
population above age 65; GDP growth; the stock of public debt; public deficit; the openness of the 
economy; unemployment rate; inflation; central government size. We also take into account the 
institutional system of different countries, by including a dummy variable for federal countries 
and a dummy variable for left-ruling political party. Definitions and sources of all variables are 
reported in table 3. 
Equation (1) is estimated using an unbalanced panel of annual data for a set of 19 OECD 
countries observed for a variable number of years until 2004 (exceptions are Australia and the 
United States) for a total of 345 observations. Table 4 gives details of the countries observed, 
of the coverage period, of missing years and about the total number of observations for each 
country. As anticipated before, the countries considered in this study differ with respect to 
their  legal  and  constitutional  settings  and  the  organisational  form  of  their  governments. 
However, all of them have at least two levels of government. The only difference consists in 
the  meaning  of  “local”  governments  for  unitary  and  federal  countries.  In  these  latter 
countries,  “State”  also  represents  a  “sub-central”  (independent)  political  institution.  We 
therefore refer to local (or sub-national or sub-central) governments as all tiers of government 
differing from the central one (state, provincial, regional and local governments). Fiscal data 
are  mainly  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund’s  (IMF)  Government  Finance  Statistics 
(GFS), but other sources have been extensively used (e.g., OECD). 
Some econometric alternatives are used for the estimation of equation (1). First of all, the 
use of time series cross-section data entails the treatment of preliminary issues. In particular, 
we first reject the possibility of using OLS on pooled data through the rejection of the null 
hypothesis  of  equality  of  intercept.  Among  alternative  panel  estimators,  a  Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) method is initially used (Jin and Zou, 2002), which is 
usually thought to be more efficient than others, especially when having 10 to 20 panels and 
10 to 40 time periods, which is basically the case of our dataset.14 Estimation with FGLS is 
performed  by  taking  into  account  heteroskedasticity,  cross-sectional  correlation  and  a 
country-specific AR(1) process. Indeed, as shown in table 5, the null hypothesis of no panel-
level  heteroskedasticity  and  that  of  no  cross-sectional  correlation  are  both  rejected  (at  1 
percent  significance  level).  Table  5  also  reports  the  results  of  testing  for  autocorrelation 
within  each  country  implementing  the  Breusch–Godfrey  LM  test.  In  this  case,  the  null 
                                                 
13 This definition excludes local non-tax revenues and local capital revenues, which are irregularly recorded. 
14 In this case a Prais-Winsten estimator can also be used, which – according to Beck and Katz (1995) – may 
perform more satisfactorily.   14 
hypothesis  of  no  autocorrelation  is  accepted  only  for  Austria;  in  all  other  cases,  the  null 
hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent significance level (exceptions are only Norway and the 
United States both at 5 percent significance level). At the same time, FGLS allows us to 
introduce  time  invariant  variables  that  may  reflect  important  economic  and  institutional 
aspects of the model (e.g., federal or unitary States). To test the robustness of the results, 
fixed effects and a Prais-Winsten panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimations are also 
performed.15 
This  econometric  analysis  is  then  complemented  by  introducing  some  dynamics.  For 
comparability of results with other studies and to take into account recent practices in the 
investigation  of  the  relationship  between  fiscal  decentralisation  and  government  size 
(Rodden, 2003; Ashworth et al., 2009; Cassette and Paty, 2010), both an Arellano and Bond 
(1991) method and an Error Correction Model (ECM) are used to identify short-run and long-
run responses to tax decentralisation considering both levels and changes of the relevant 
variables. This is mainly motivated by the fact that a variety of factors might cause only a 
transitory impact on local spending. 
 
 
4.2. Discussing variables 
 
A brief discussion of the variable used in the econometric analysis may help interpret results. 
With  regard  to  the  dependent  variable  (Size),  it  is  worth  noting  that  among  studies 
investigating the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and the size of the public sector, 
a general agreement emerges on using the ratio between public expenditures and GDP.16 
This is mainly due to the fact that considering tax revenues only is likely to underestimate 
the actual government size since it would disregard all public spending and activities financed 
by debt and deficit.17 The main difference among empirical works using the ratio between 
expenditures and GDP is that some consider “local” governments (Wallis and Oates, 1988; 
Zax, 1989; Forbes and Zampelli, 1989; Shadbegian, 1999; De Mello, 2001; Feld et al. 2003); 
others  refer  to  “total”  or  “aggregate”  governments  (Marlow,  1988;  Grossman,  1989; 
Kneebone, 1992; Ehdaie, 1994; Grossman and West, 1994; Shadbegian, 1999; Stein, 1999; 
Fiva, 2006; Prohl and Schneider, 2009); a few focus on both (Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 
2003; Cassette and Paty, 2010). In this paper, we follow the standard approach and consider 
local public expenditures as a percentage of GDP to proxy the local government size.18 
With regard to the indicator of fiscal decentralisation, a reliable measure should quantify 
the  activities  of  sub-central  governments  arising  from  their  autonomous  decisions.19  To 
accommodate  this  issue,  two  decentralisation  proxies  distinguishing  between  financing 
sources are usually adopted (Jin and Zou, 2002; Prohl and Schneider, 2009; Cassette and Paty, 
                                                 
15 Note, however, that fixed effects have a more problematic interpretation in our case, as the sample does not 
represent a closed and exhaustive set of units. Rather, it is mainly based on data availability. Furthermore, results 
are not necessarily expected to be in line with the use of FGLS, as fixed effects uses only variation within units and 
disregards variation between units (i.e., it gives short-run responses). In our case, however, the Hausman test rejects 
the random effect estimator. 
16 In some cases, data on tax revenues are used to proxy the size of government (Oates, 1972; Oates, 1985; Forbes 
and  Zampelli,  1989;  Zax,  1989);  in  some  others  both  revenue  and  expenditure  components  are  alternatively 
considered (Nelson, 1987; Wallis and Oates, 1988). 
17 Moreover, when studies focus on the effect of fiscal federalism only on the size of sub-national governments, 
without any interest for the central government functions, they sometimes adopt revenue measures to indicate the 
dependent variable (Oates, 1985; Forbes and Zampelli, 1989; Zax, 1989). However, the underestimation problem 
remains,  given  the  possibility  of  borrowing  -  as  source  of  financing  local  public  expenditures  -  also  for  local 
governments. 
18  More  recently,  some  researchers  (Fiva,  2006;  Ashworth  et  al.,  2009)  focus  their  attention  on  how  fiscal 
decentralisation may affect the public sector, distinguishing total size and its composition. In particular, how it may 
affect spending on social security transfers and government consumption (Fiva, 2006); and how it may influence 
different expenditure programs: health care, education and social security (Ashworth et al., 2009). 
19 In general, it is quite difficult to represent and measure the degree of fiscal federalism as the concept itself is 
broad, and also complex in terms of both quantitative and qualitative indexes (World Bank, 2004). Prud’homme 
(1995) defines fiscal federalism through three simple criteria: i) the importance of local taxes relative to central 
taxes, (ii) the importance of local expenditures relative to central expenditures, and (iii) the importance of central 
subsidies to local own-source revenues.   15 
2010):  a  measure  of  tax  revenue  decentralisation  (that  should  proxy  the  degree  of  tax 
autonomy attached to any local government); a measure of vertical imbalance quantified by 
intergovernmental grants (indicating the degree of dependence of local governments on the 
common pool of national governments). 20 
While the second indicator entails fewer problems, the first one may be overestimated for 
two reasons. The first is that some decentralised taxes finance spending decisions taken by 
the  central  government  (as  in  the  case  of  services  entailing  the  provision  of  minimum 
standards, or in the case of expenditures that are classified as “local”, but that can be mandated 
by the central government or spent on behalf of it, without any autonomous local spending 
decision). In this case, local governments cannot dispose of the corresponding tax revenues. 
Using these revenues to measure tax decentralisation would ignore that the correspondence 
between budgetary items and actual decision-making may be imperfect.21 The second – and 
more relevant for our paper – is that the extent of local taxing power and autonomy may be 
misrepresented without distinguishing between locally determined taxes, taxes regulated by 
the central government, shared taxes and taxes levied as surcharges on national taxes.  
To  our  knowledge,  there  is  no  attempt  in  the  literature  to  investigate  the  differential 
impact of local taxes on government size. For this reason, equation (1) has been estimated 
using the three main local taxes on which data were available for all years and countries 
included in the analysis, i.e. income taxes, property taxes and taxes on goods and services. Through 
the use of this disaggregation, equation (1) will not only disentangle the contribution of each 
tax source to local government spending; it will also allow to get direct information on the 
importance of the tax assignment methods (tax sharing or “tax separation”). Just recall from 
paragraph 3 that PT are usually assigned on a tax separation basis, while both IT and GST 
are either piggybacked or involved in pure tax sharing formulas. 
Finally, to ensure that any correlation between fiscal decentralisation and the size of the 
public sector is not due to the effect of the general macroeconomic environment, we include 
some control variables into the analysis, as also suggested by the existing literature on the 
growth and size of government. In this vein, we consider population, population below age 14 
and  population  above  age  65  to  describe  the  effect  of  demographics  on  demand  for  public 
spending  -  for  welfare  spending  in  particular  -  and  to  capture  economies  of  scale  in  the 
provision of public goods and services. The growth of real GDP (as a percentage change of 
previous year) is introduced to take into account the possibility of a “Wagner’s law” effect, 
which suggests that government spending is income elastic. Budget deficit and public debt may 
also determine the growth of the public sector. Thus, we control for them building a dummy 
variable for the first item (coded as “1” = deficit; “0” = otherwise), and considering gross 
government debt as a percentage of GDP for the second item. To capture the prediction of 
the globalisation literature (Rodrik, 1998) and the consequences of international integration 
of national goods and service markets, the “openness effect” is introduced as the sum of exports 
and imports over GDP. Its impact on government size may be positive (Rodrik, 1998) or 
negative (Ferris and West, 1996). Other macroeconomic variables potentially affecting public 
spending  are  unemployment  rate  and  inflation.  The  former  is  measured  as  a  percentage  of 
civilian labour force; the latter as annual averages of percentage change in the consumer price 
level. Finally, the size of the central government is introduced to control for possible shifting of 
spending competencies among government levels. 
                                                 
20  For  countries  like  Germany,  where  sub-central  governments  have  only  limited  autonomy  upon  taxation,  a 
drastically lower degree of decentralisation is reported as compared to measures drawing on unadjusted revenue 
statistics  (Stegarescu,  2005).  Moreover,  the  previous  OECD  study  (1999)  reveals  that  some  local  government 
sectors do not determine tax bases and tax rates, although they collect a large amount of revenues. In order to take 
into account the various facets of decentralisation – given also some limits of quantitative data – different non-
quantitative measures have also been proposed in the literature. In this vein, Prohl and Schneider (2009) explore 
DH  also  using  a  qualitative  measure  that  considers  the  constitutionally  and  statutorily  defined  fiscal  and 
administrative autonomy of sub-national governments. Ashworth et al. (2009) also introduce a vector of dummy 
variables that capture the degree of decentralisation of public expenditures to investigate LH. 
21 A system where sub-central governments have actual autonomy to determine the allocation of their expenditure 
or to raise own revenue is more decentralised than another system where local or regional government spending 
and revenue is determined by national legislation, even though the formal assignment of functions or revenues 




5. Tax decentralisation and government size: empirical results 
 
5.1. Panel estimators 
 
Table  6  describes  the  results  of  the  econometric  analysis  when  using  alternative  panel 
estimators. By considering the variables included below the heading of “Independent variables”, 
which are the core of our analysis, interesting insights can be gained by using disaggregated 
tax items. With a FGLS estimation, support is found to the standard result that grants are 
positively related to local government size. This outcome is consistent with the “common pool” 
hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Nelson, 1987; Grossman, 1989; Zax, 1989) and with 
previous empirical findings (Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Prohl and Schneider, 2009). As 
discussed  above,  the  justification  of  this  result  is  rather  standard  and  intuitive: 
decentralisation based on intergovernmental transfers enhances the growth of the local public 
sector since sub-national governments would spend any transfers (other’s people money) more 
easily than they would spend local own tax revenues. 
The most innovative results of the estimation relate to the sign of the disaggregated tax 
items:  local  GST  would  produce  the  same  positive  impact  as  grants  (and  even  higher  in 
magnitude);  IT  show  a  negative  but  not  statistically  significant  sign;  while  PT  show  a 
negative and statistically significant sign that supports our maintained hypothesis. Indeed, 
this gives a first input to the impression that not all taxes are the same for tax decentralisation. 
Before discussing this result, it is worth considering the alternative panel estimators (fixed 
effects and PCSE). On the one hand, both the positive sign of grants and the negative sign of 
property taxes are robust to the change of the estimator; with fixed effects – mostly capturing 
short-run impacts – the coefficients are also larger in magnitude. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of IT is not statistically significant in all cases, while the coefficient of GST loses 
its significance with FE but not with PCSE. 
We  take  this  outcome  as  evidence  that  the  power  of  IT  and  GST  in  reducing  local 
government  size  is  rather  weak.  In  some  cases,  GST  may  even  favour  a  bigger  local 
government size. This can be explained, as noted in paragraph 3, by the fact that local GST 
are mostly organised either on a pure tax sharing scheme or on a piggybacking of central 
government taxes in several countries, which may allow some degree of tax illusion in the 
taxing  and  spending  policy  of  sub-central  governments  (especially  when  the  tax  base  is 
centrally determined and the impact of central and local policies not easily disentangled).22 
The persistent negative sign of PT, instead, can be at least partially justified by the fact 
that these taxes are usually assigned on a “tax separation” basis and rarely shared (only in 
Austria  in  our  sample).  This  implies  that  PT  give  local  governments  a  larger  degree  of 
autonomy on both tax rates and tax bases, and contribute to reduce the opacity of a system of 
overlapping  competencies.  According  to  the  theories  of  competitive  federalism,  more 
accountability  would  indeed  be  guaranteed  by  the  absence  of  ambiguity  about  which 
authority is entitled to tax any given tax base; a greater autonomy in the administration of 
PT would thus imply a greater responsibility of the local policy makers in both collection and 
spending activities. 
To this purpose, it is worth considering that property taxes have the appealing feature of 
being particularly close to the “benefit principle”, which is a long-standing and particularly 
suitable principle of local taxation, even though of hard practical application (see, recently, 
                                                 
22 In order to verify whether the result depends on the presence of the United States where sales taxes are only 
applied by states, the same regression has been run excluding US. Results do not change. With regard to GST, 
Musgrave (1983) suggested that taxes on production and consumption with a large tax base -  particularly as the 
general sales tax - should be treated differently depending on the production stage to which they are applied. In this 
vein,  the  assignment  to  sub-national  levels  is  recommended  only  for  taxes  in  the  end-stage  of  the 
production/distribution process, unless local governments are too fractionated. Indeed, local authorities should be 
large  enough  to  overcome  the  mobility  issue  (as  in  the  United  States  and  Canada).  Indeed,  where  applied, 
state/regional governments rely more on taxes on goods and services (mainly sales taxes) than local governments 
do (OECD, 2009a).   17 
Liberati,  2010).23  Oates  (2001),  for  example,  argues  that  the  property  tax  is  visible  and 
transparent  and  therefore  stimulates  voters  to  be  aware  about  the  costs  of  local  public 
programs. Our result sounds like an indirect proof that if revenue and expenditure decisions 
are not tied at the local level, the restraining effects of fiscal federalism on local and total 
spending are weak. We add to this result, by saying that a tight link between tax revenues 
and spending decisions appears to be best served when tax decentralisation is based on a tax 
separation scheme. An interesting insight seems therefore to emerge from this analysis: when 
taxes are assigned on a “tax base sharing” (or piggybacking) scheme, they do not significantly 
affect government size (or at least the outcome is very uncertain); they would instead do 
when assigned on a “separation scheme”. 
Finally, some issues about control variables: table 6 shows that federal countries tend to 
have a smaller sub-national government (with FGLS), while left coalitions seem to positively 
affect the growth of the public sector at the local level (also with FE, but not with PCSE). 
When  the  real  GDP  grows,  the  size  of  local  governments  is  smaller,  while  debt,  deficit 
(general government) and openness do not significantly affect local government size (the 
exception of debt when using FGLS). Also, controlling for central government size has an 
impact only when using FE (a negative relation with local government size, implying some 






5.2. Results with the Arellano-Bond estimator 
 
In order to introduce some dynamics and to deal with potential endogeneity of explanatory 
variables,  an  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  methodology  is  applied.  This  implies  estimating 
equation (1) in first differences (i.e. considering changes rather than levels) with some lag 
structure on both the dependent and the explanatory variables. Results are reported in table 
7, where the explanatory variables (the variables describing the financing sources) are treated 
alternatively as endogenous or predetermined, while control variables are treated as truly 
exogenous. Whether endogenous or predetermined, explanatory variables are instrumented 
using a maximum of two lags. Furthermore, the lag of the dependent variable is introduced to 
capture the persistency of local government size and also instrumented with two lags. In both 
cases (endogenous or predetermined), the Sargan test of the null hypothesis of instruments 
validity is not rejected. Also the tests for autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 give the right sign, 
in this case suggesting that the structure of lags is consistent. Results are neat and findings 
confirm the previous estimation. In both cases, grants have a positive impact, while property 
taxes would support a lower local government size. Also in this case, income taxes do not 
seem  to  play  any  role  in  shaping  local  spending,  while  the  positive  impact  of  GST  is 
confirmed with a magnitude slightly lower than that estimated for grants. It is also worth 
noting that local government spending has a certain degree of persistence (the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable is 0.65). 
 
 
5.3. Results with the ECM 
                                                 
23 Tiebout (1956) discussed the beneficial effects of the property tax for local government. Because the value of 
public goods is capitalised into the value of local property, dependence on property taxation leads city managers to 
choose public goods that maximise local property values. Moreover, city managers facing intense interjurisdictional 
competition have incentives to maximise property values as a means of inducing scarce capital and labour to locate 
and remain in their jurisdiction. Because these taxes provide general incentives for local political officials to design 
policies that foster markets and attract capital and labour, property taxes are an important component of local 
government  fiscal  structure.  Bahl  and  Linn  (1992)  provide  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  discussions  of  the 
property tax in decentralised systems. Fischel (2001) and Glaeser (1996) explain why property taxation leads local 
governments to focus on citizen welfare. In general, the normative suggestion was to assign the property tax to 
local governments, because it can work as a benefit tax and can be used to provide mobile economic units (like 
households and firms) with an efficient (and differentiated) level of local services (Oates, 2005; Boetti et al., 2010).    18 
 
The previous methodology, however, does not consider long-run responses. The fact that 
local  government  size  may  either  increase  or  decrease  according  to  the  composition  of 
financing  sources  suggests  that  local  expenditures  may  have  a  long-run  target,  i.e.  an 
equilibrium level. This implies that financing sources may cause both short-run and long-run 
effects. The former will cause temporary deviations from the long-run equilibrium, the latter 
will  affect  the  equilibrium  level  (Rodden,  2003;  Ashworth  et  al.,  2009).  Whether  this 
distinction between long-run and short-run effects is meaningful is therefore an empirical 
issue that needs further specification beyond the Arellano-Bond estimation. 
In order to deal with this problem, equation (1) can be transformed in an ECM. This 
amounts to expanding the equation used for the Arellano-Bond estimation to include the 
levels of the dependent variable and those of the explanatory variables. For simplicity, define 
;  ;  ;  ;  ,  where  the  panel  indicator  i  is 
omitted.  Assuming  one  lag  as  the  timing  of  adjustment,  a  disequilibrium  relationship 
involving  first-order  lags  of  both  endogenous  and  exogenous  variables  would  give  the 
following  model  (disregarding  control  variables),  which  is  in  fact  an  Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (1,1) model: 
 
(2)       
 
Now, by subtracting   from both sides and adding and subtracting to the right hand side 
,  ,   and  , after manipulation one has the following: 
 
(3)         
 
where:  ;  ;  ;  ;  .  After  direct 
estimation  of  equation  (3),  which  is  suggested  by  Wickens  and  Breusch  (1988)  for  small 
samples and by Banjeree et al. (1986) for multivariate models,  ’s coefficients will give short-
run responses, while long-run responses  , for each variable s, can be recovered by using 
.24 The first advantage of equation (3) is that the dependent variable is differenced, 
which  reduces  the  risk  of  estimating  a  spurious  regression;  the  second  is  that  it  can  be 
estimated with standard panel estimators; the third is that it provides an expansion of the 
Arellano-Bond estimation and an indirect test of robustness for the short-run responses of 
explanatory variables. Estimating equation (3) requires the series to be non-stationary in 
levels and stationary at some difference (if they were not, the distinction between short-run 
and long-run responses would be meaningless).25 The non-stationarity of the series and the 
stationarity of their first differences are tested by a panel version of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test as developed by Im et al. (1997).26 Results are shown in table 8, where the average 
test shows that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for variables in 
levels, while it can be rejected for their first differences, with the tests violated in some cases, 
but not on average. 
Different panel estimators (FGLS, FE and PCSE) have been used to estimate equation (3) 
(table 9). As expected, the speed of adjustment (i.e. the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable) is less than one in absolute terms to guarantee the stability of the system. As also 
expected, being referred to variables under the control of the public sector, it is relatively 
slow (below 0.2 in all cases), which means that only 20 percent of the adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium occurs in the first year. 
Considering  first  short-run  responses,  again  the  main  regularity  is  traced  for  grants 
(always  positive)  and  property  taxes  (always  negative).  The  positive  sign  of  grants  is 
consistent with the “common pool” hypothesis. Among taxes, only those on property seem to 
                                                 
24 The long-run coefficient is obtained by the long-run equation (3), implying  . 
25 But see Keele and De Boef (2004) for use of ECM with stationary data. 
26 This test is an average t-test of country-specific standard Dickey-Fuller tests.   19 
negatively affect the size of the local public sector in the short-run, with an impact that is not 
fully  compensated  for  by  the  short-run  increase  of  local  government  size  due  to 
intergovernmental grants. Hence, property taxation seems to work as a powerful disciplining 
device for local government at least in the short run. In this vein, results give further support 
to previous findings by Borge and Rattso (2008), where data indicate that property taxes 
embody mechanisms of cost control, and to their interpretation that having a visible and 
controversial  local  tax  related  to  property  stimulates  voter  interest  in  local  government 
activities and thereby may help control costs.  
Taxes on goods and services have instead a positive impact on local government size in 
two out of three cases, while the income tax is not found to affect local government size in 
any case. Therefore, at least in the short-run, our maintained hypothesis is supported: grants 
increase local government size, while only taxes based on a separation scheme (as PT) would 
be able to contain it. 
With regard to long-run variables, however, things are slightly different, as all financing 
sources seem to be rather weak in slowing the growth of the local government. The only 
stable result of the ECM analysis is that grants have a non-negligible and positive impact 
also in the long-run. In principle, all taxes would have a similar positive effect (with the 
exception of GST in two cases); yet, the   parameters are hardly statistically significant for 
IT,  PT  and  GST,  suggesting  that  tax  decentralisation  has  no  permanent  effect  on  local 
government size. At 10 percent significance level, however, PT would have a positive impact 
on size comparable to that calculated for grants. It is worth noting that repeating the same 
analysis using an ECM transformation of an ADL(2,1), i.e. with two lags of the dependent 
variable, does not change results significantly (not reported in table). The coefficient of local 
government size at t-2 is not significant (10 percent with FGLS); the coefficients of all taxes – 
and  therefore  the  corresponding  short-run  and  long-run  impacts  –  are  the  same  as  in 
ADL(1,1); the only exception is for grants, whose impact in the long-run would be zero under 
FGLS and FE (but not under PCSE). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
A  wide  empirical  literature  has  looked  for  evidence  of  the  relationship  between  fiscal 
federalism and the size of the public sector. In this vein, some theoretical hypotheses have 
been tested by many scholars, stressing in most cases that the “quality” of decentralisation is a 
crucial issue to determine larger (or smaller) government size - i.e., the fact that the size of 
the public sector is likely to be smaller when decentralisation is funded by own taxes, and 
comparatively larger, when funding comes from central government grants (Grossman, 1989; 
Grossman and West, 1994; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Fiva, 2006; Ashworth et al., 
2009; Prohl and Schneider, 2009; Cassette and Paty, 2010).  
However,  the  distinction  between  taxes  that  sub-central  governments  apply  in  a  tax 
separation  scheme  or  taxes  that  they  apply  following  a  piggybacking  approach  has  been 
usually ignored. Indeed, while the different accountability content of grants and own taxes 
has  been  over  time  sufficiently  explored,  the  existing  literature  is  more  silent  about  the 
possibility  that  different  types  of  tax  autonomy  may  have  differential  impacts  on  the 
expansion of the public sector, especially at the local level. In addition, more recently Cassette 
and  Paty  (2010)  show  that  decentralisation  may  unexpectedly  increase  sub-central 
government size even when it is financed by own tax revenues, and they conclude pointing 
out  the  necessity  to  determine  whether  the  nature  of  the  taxes  available  to  sub-national 
governments  plays  a  role  in  this  process.  An  analysis  of  what  kind  of  local  taxes  are 
responsible for this outcome is still empirically lacking.  
To this purpose, our paper adds to the empirical studies by using improved disaggregated 
data on tax revenue decentralisation to re-examine the relationship between fiscal federalism 
and the size of local government, introducing a new testable hypothesis - the “Tax Separation 
Hypothesis” (TSH) - according to which tax decentralisation organised on tax bases used only 
by local governments would favour most the containment of local public expenditures, while 
that organised on a tax base sharing is not expected to have a significant impact on the local 
government size.  
In detail, we have focused on the three main pillars of own local tax revenues - income 
taxes, property taxes and taxes on goods and services - and test their impact on the size of 
local government spending, applying a panel model, an Arellano-Bond estimation and an 
ECM  to  an  OECD  sample  over  the  period  1980-2004.  The  preliminary  observation  of 
decentralised tax systems in these countries reveals that full tax decentralisation is more 
unusual than commonly thought. Moreover, any consideration about the fact that not all 
taxes may have the same (negative) impact on the size of the local public sector is virtually 
absent, while it is standard to focus on the potential different impact of grants (positive) and 
aggregate local taxes (negative) on government size. 
To make our study robust to conventional results (e.g. Rodden, 2003) – consistent with 
the “common pool” hypothesis and the “flypaper effect” – grants from higher levels of government 
are included into the analysis. While intergovernmental transfers have the expected (positive) 
impact  on  the  size  of  the  local  public  sector,  new  insights  emerge  from  considering 
disaggregated taxes. In particular, property taxes only – the most prominent “own tax” in 
many of the countries analysed – seem to negatively affect the size of local governments. 
Instead, both income taxes and general taxes on goods and services – that are often applied 
with either a tax sharing or a tax base sharing method – have uncertain impacts on local 
government  size.  These  results  also  remain  valid  when  we  use  different  estimation 
techniques. 
Some  old  and  new  insights  emerge  from  this  paper.  First,  more  traditionally,  tax 
autonomy  matters  for  the  size  of  the  public  sector.  When  financed  by  grants,  local 
government spending tends to grow. Second, if the aim of fiscal decentralisation is to contain 
(local) public spending, tax decentralisation may not necessarily shrink it, but it depends on 
the tax decentralisation scheme. According to our findings, tax decentralisation is a necessary 
condition to reduce the size of the public sector, yet it is not sufficient. Indeed, this is more 
likely to occur when local taxes are applied on a “tax separation” scheme rather than on a tax 
base sharing method, as indirectly proved by the estimated impact of property taxes. Third, 
the  containment  of  local  spending  is  more  likely  in  the  short-run.  In  the  long-run,  tax   21 
decentralisation does not seem sufficient to guarantee local spending control, even though its 
impact can still be more effective than that measured for grants. To some extent, while grants 
may have a positive long-run impact on local government size, decentralised taxes would be 
more neutral in shaping the equilibrium level of local spending.   22 
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Note:  DH=Decentralisation  Hypothesis;  LH=Leviathan  Hypothesis;  WH=Wallis  Hypothesis;  CH=Collusion 
Hypothesis; FH=Fragmentation Hypothesis; FIH=Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis; TG=Total (or aggregate) government 
size; LG=Local government size; CG=Central (or national) government size. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations 
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Note: a=Discretion on rates and reliefs; b=Discretion on rates; c=Discretion on reliefs; d=Tax sharing arrangements; 
e=Other methods; LG=Local governments; R=Regional governments; Co=Counties; Lan=Lander; M=Municipalities; 
PB=Polder Board; AR=Autonomous Regions; Ca=Cantons; Com=Communities; Pr=Provinces; “/”=Tax not applied. 
. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on OECD data   28 
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Table 6 – Results with standard panel estimators 
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Table 8 – Tests for stationarity 
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